General Assembly Third Committee
Obstacles to and the Fair Distribution of Humanitarian Aid — examined through the case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Quick Brief — Russian Federation
Core Position (from Position Matrix)
- Consistently frames Israeli restrictions as violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Arts. 55/56/59) and treats a ceasefire as the precondition for, not the result of, humanitarian access.
- Voted for UNSC Res. 2728 (2024) after an unsuccessful attempt to strengthen its language; abstained on Res. 2803 (2025).
- Strong, sustained supporter of UNRWA; criticised the 2025 "new aid distribution mechanism" (GHF) as compromising humanitarian neutrality.
- Own material contributions (~800+ tonnes via EMERCOM by Jan 2026) are modest relative to the guide's $2.4B funding gap — a symbolic rather than large-scale financial contribution.
Most Relevant Open Debates
Most-Cited Laws
- Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts. 18 & 23 — core legal basis for Russia's blockade criticism
- UNGA Res. 46/182 (1991) — four-principles framework Russia invokes against Israel/GHF
- UNSC Res. 2728 (2024) — Russia's own vote & failed amendment
Actors Nearby / In Tension
- Aligned-ish: China (parallel abstention on Res. 2803, joint Aug 2025 IPC statement)
- Rhetorically aligned: Arab League / OIC (blockade & IHL criticism), though Russia is less active on reconstruction financing
- In tension: United States (competing draft resolutions, March 2024); Israel (direct target of Russia's IHL criticism)
Letter from the Dais Team
Welcome, delegates, to Adventure MUN Camp 2026. On behalf of the academic team — chairs Abigail Liu, Alicia Tseng, Cassidy Weng, Jing Zhi Lin, Shinny Lin, Stella Chiang, and Winona Zhan — we're glad to have you in the General Assembly Third Committee.
MUN isn't simple role-play. It's an exercise in understanding what's happening in the world and practicing how to address it. This year, GA3 takes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: you'll be weighing the fate of hundreds of thousands of civilians in critical need of humanitarian assistance.
We're discussing the lives of people in the midst of war. Delegations will value different things, and no one set of priorities is inherently right or wrong — your job is to advocate skillfully for the interests of the country you represent, and to have fun doing it.
The General Assembly & GA3
The General Assembly (GA)
The GA is the UN's main policy-making body and its only organ with universal membership — all 193 member states plus 2 observer states hold an equal vote and seat.[25]
"The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations."
Because every state holds one equal vote, the GA operates through extensive debate aimed at broad consensus. Its discussions span the full range of issues in the UN Charter — peace and security, human rights, sustainable development, and international law.[26]
Functions & Powers
The GA may
- Make recommendations on cooperation and to member states
- Request investigations, reports, and the Secretary-General's good offices
- Elect members of other UN organs
- Debate international political issues
- Facilitate diplomacy and coalition-building
The GA may not
- Make legally binding decisions on political/security matters
- Act on issues actively before the Security Council
- Force great powers to comply with resolutions
- Exercise executive or enforcement powers
- Compel member states to act, as the Security Council can
Because GA3 can only recommend, not enforce, Russia's floor speeches here carry no binding weight over Israel or the Security Council — this is one reason Russia's actual leverage on this file runs mainly through the Security Council, where it holds a P5 veto (see Res. 2728/2803 votes below).
GA3 — Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Committee (SOCHUM)
GA3 covers human rights standards, drafts policy resolutions, and reviews global humanitarian crises. Its portfolio includes women's rights, racial discrimination, child protection, refugee treatment, the right to self-determination, and social development topics such as youth, ageing, disability, and criminal justice. It also reviews reports from the Human Rights Council's special procedures.[28]
Origins of the Conflict
The conflict is not the product of a single quarrel — it was built up over generations. It traces back to 135 CE, when Jews were expelled from the land of Israel by the Roman Empire. For centuries afterward, many Jews in exile sought to return to Jerusalem, held as their holy land.
The Aliyahs & Rising Tension (1880s–1914)
- 1881 — First Aliyah: a major wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, driven partly by persecution elsewhere. Zionism took shape through the 1880s, as Jewish arrivals bought land, built businesses, and settled among the existing Arab population.
- 1904–1914 — Second Aliyah: roughly 40,000 more Jewish immigrants arrive; the first kibbutz is founded in 1909.
- This wave of immigration and settlement laid the foundation for growing tension between Jewish newcomers and the Arab population already there — the root of the conflict that followed.
World War I & Three Competing Promises (1914–1918)
The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, becoming an enemy of Britain. In the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, Britain promised Arab nationalists an independent Arab state in exchange for revolt against the Ottomans. In 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement, secretly dividing Ottoman territory between themselves — contradicting the earlier promise. In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, promising a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.[1]
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people... it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
Britain made three separate, conflicting promises: independence to the Arabs, partition to the French, and a homeland to the Jews. None of the three parties agreed on who the land ultimately belonged to — the origin of nearly all subsequent disputes.
1920s to 1947: Mandate, Partition, and Statehood
- Post-WWI, France and Britain divided former Ottoman territory per Sykes-Picot; Britain received a League of Nations mandate over Palestine.
- 1936–1939: Arab dissatisfaction with British rule led to the Thawrat Filastin al-Kubra (Great Arab Revolt); Britain first floated partition in 1937.
- 1947 — UNGA Res. 181: the UN voted to partition the land, allocating 55% to a Jewish state and 45% to an Arab state, with Jerusalem under UN administration.[2]
- On the last day of the British Mandate, Israel declared its founding, dividing the land along the 1947 UN plan.
Obstacles to Delivering Humanitarian Aid
Humanitarian aid is not just trucks of food and medicine — it's a coordinated international effort involving governments, organizations, local authorities, and international agencies. Before examining what obstructs its delivery, delegates must understand the basic principles and mechanisms meant to keep it operating smoothly. When these are not followed, or delivery is restricted or interfered with, aid may not reach civilians safely or in time.
The Four Main Principles
Per UNGA Res. 46/182 (1991), the four fundamental principles of humanitarian aid are Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality, and Independence. These form the values and norms of conduct underlying all humanitarian action.[30]
🇷🇺Russia PositionNo dedicated statement on the four principles themselves — but actively invokes them to criticize others▾
Summary
Research turned up no standalone Russian statement interpreting the four principles themselves. Russia does, however, consistently invoke humanity/neutrality/impartiality/independence as a rhetorical and legal standard when criticizing Israel and the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) — e.g. describing GHF as compromising the "neutrality and impartiality" of UN humanitarian action (13 May 2025 Security Council briefing). The 2023 Russian draft ceasefire resolution also used the standard "humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence" language common to most draft texts.
Assessment
Treat as: principled endorsement used instrumentally against third parties, not an independent doctrinal position. No contradiction found — simply an absence of a dedicated statement.
Sources
russiaun.ru (13 May 2025) UNSC draft resolution text, Oct 20231. Humanity — protecting life and alleviating suffering
"Regardless of race, gender, age, economic status, or other conditions, every human deserves and should receive humanitarian assistance when their life is threatened."
In Gaza, fuel shortages since 2023 have repeatedly threatened hospital operating rooms, ICUs, and neonatal incubators. WHO has consistently appealed for fuel and medical-supply deliveries to keep healthcare systems running — a direct embodiment of the Humanity principle.
2. Neutrality — refraining from taking sides
"Organizations providing humanitarian aid must not support or oppose any belligerent party, nor intervene in political, religious, or ideological disputes."
A perceived bias can cause one side to deny an organization access, or even attack its workers. During the 2025 Gaza ceasefire, the ICRC acted as a neutral intermediary in the exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, communicating with both sides without representing either — an exchange that would have been far harder without its neutrality.
3. Impartiality — aid based solely on need
"Allocation must be based on need, not status."
In North Gaza, the IPC assessment system recorded famine-level (Phase 5) conditions, with over 20% of families facing extreme food shortages and high acute child malnutrition; Gaza health authorities reported 180+ hunger/malnutrition deaths, mostly children. Aid was accordingly prioritized toward North Gaza — an application of Impartiality.
4. Independence — free from political or military influence
"Humanitarian organizations have the right to decide for themselves who to help, how to help, and when to help, rather than acting in accordance with the interests of a government, the military, or any political interest."
The clearest cautionary example is Ethiopia (2023): the WFP suspended food aid after discovering widespread misappropriation, halting distribution until stronger monitoring was in place — illustrating the tension between non-interference and timely delivery.
Political, Legal & Security Challenges
Even where organizations try to uphold the four principles, delivering relief into an active war zone still runs into intense political friction, legal hurdles, and security risk.
1. State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Access
Sovereignty is "a state's supreme authority to govern its own territory and make decisions without external interference." Because aid also needs state consent to enter, delivery speed and volume depend heavily on local regulation. In Gaza, access is governed by several factions with diverging stances:
- Israel: maintains that strict border screening is essential to prevent Hamas from diverting military supplies or smuggling weapons under cover of aid shipments. COGAT holds unilateral power to slow or reject convoys on security grounds, since Israel controls Gaza's airspace, maritime access, and major land crossings such as Kerem Shalom.
- Palestinian governance / Hamas's influence: Hamas has historically managed local administration; while it frames unrestricted aid as essential to civilian survival and its own legitimacy, Western donors generally refuse direct contact or funding due to its status as a designated terrorist organization in several states. International bodies have also condemned Hamas-affiliated personnel for forcing entry into distribution sites and intimidating aid workers.
🇷🇺Russia PositionConsistently prioritizes humanitarian access over sovereignty-based security controls▾
Summary
Russia consistently frames Israel's blockade and access restrictions as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, arguing humanitarian access should not be subordinated to security control.
Details
- 13 May 2025 Security Council briefing: Russian representative Nebenzia explicitly accused Israel of violating Arts. 55, 56 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (guarantees of civilians' basic supplies).
- 17 Oct 2024 briefing: Russia called Israel's "over a year of airstrikes" civilian toll "shocking," citing past patterns of blocking Palestinian children from receiving medical treatment abroad.
- Oct 2023: Russia's own draft ceasefire resolution (humanitarian-focused, did not name Hamas, called for rescinding Israel's evacuation order for northern Gaza) was rejected 4–5 in the Security Council; Russia's delegate said afterward that "Western countries trampled the world's expectations."
- Consistent line: without a ceasefire, humanitarian work cannot function — sovereignty-based control should not override humanitarian obligation.
Sources
russiaun.ru (13 May 2025, 17 Oct 2024, 3 Apr 2024) press.un.org ReliefWeb / UN News (26 Oct 2023)2. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
IHL requires parties to distinguish civilians from combatants and to facilitate relief when essential supplies run short; humanitarian personnel and medical facilities receive special protection if not used for military purposes. Humanitarian groups argue a government cannot lawfully block aid amid starvation; militaries counter that IHL permits limiting aid where there is a clear "military necessity." The debate is where legitimate military-necessity control crosses into an illegal blockade of civilian survival supplies.
🇷🇺Russia PositionConsistently characterizes Israeli restrictions as violating IHL / the Fourth Geneva Convention▾
Summary
Same underlying record as Topic 2 above — Russia's position on sovereignty and on IHL compliance is expressed through the same statements, since Russia frames the blockade itself as the IHL violation.
Details
- Cites Fourth Geneva Convention Arts. 55, 56, 59 directly (13 May 2025).
- No separate Russian doctrinal statement was found distinguishing "military necessity" from unlawful blockade in the abstract — Russia's public statements apply the IHL framework directly to Israel's conduct rather than debating the legal standard itself.
Sources
russiaun.ru (13 May 2025) press.un.org3. Protection of Medical Facilities
Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention grants special protection to hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, forfeited only if they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy. On 13 October 2023, the IDF ordered over 1.1 million Palestinians in northern Gaza (including Gaza City) to move south within 24 hours ahead of a ground offensive — triggering operational crises at hospitals including Al-Shifa, the Indonesian Hospital, and Al-Quds, where evacuating ICU patients, premature babies, and trauma cases was judged nearly impossible by WHO and the ICRC. The IDF proceeded regardless, forcing several facilities to shut down, relocate, or operate under severely compromised conditions.
4. Dual-Use Goods
Dual-use goods are civilian items with potential military application. Israel requires special approval for designated dual-use items entering Gaza. Since October 2023, humanitarian organizations report the restricted list expanding well beyond the official standard — generators, water pumps, medical equipment, tent poles, flashlights, non-electric wheelchairs, tarpaulins, sleeping bags, and portable toilets have all been delayed or denied at various points, often with inconsistent approval criteria.
🇷🇺Russia PositionNo direct public statement found — plausible inference only▾
Summary
Russia has not been found taking a specific public position on "dual-use goods" classification — a relatively technical issue usually handled at the WHO/OCHA operational level rather than in Security Council speeches.
Reasoned inference (not a direct quote)
Given Russia's consistent position that humanitarian access should take priority over security-based control (see Topics 2–3), one can reasonably infer Russia would be skeptical of an overly broad dual-use classification impeding aid — but this is an inference from Russia's general pattern, not a documented statement on this specific issue.
Sources
No direct Russian statement located as of this research pass5. Smuggling
Because humanitarian aid typically clears customs, duties, and inspection with minimal friction, it is vulnerable to diversion. Two documented patterns:
- Diversion to armed groups: a Nov 2024 U.S. federal indictment accused an NGO regional manager of diverting over $9M in USAID-funded food aid meant for Syrian civilians to commanders of the terrorist group Nusra Front (ANF), falsifying beneficiary records to cover it up.
- Weapons hidden in convoys: on 10 Nov 2024, Israeli forces intercepted a convoy on the Netzarim corridor and found small-arms ammunition concealed within it — underscoring the tension between rapid humanitarian access and thorough security screening.
Smuggling & Black Markets
Black markets — illegal, unregulated trading networks — disrupt aid distribution through three mechanisms:
- Convoy hijacking: armed groups and opportunists intercept relief trucks near checkpoints, seizing food, medical supplies, and fuel before they reach recipients.
- Market distortion: stolen goods flow into informal markets at inflated prices, pricing out displaced and impoverished civilians.
- Operational paralysis: widespread looting forces NGOs and UN agencies to repeatedly halt truck movements.
The pattern began in early 2024 near the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings, where armed criminal syndicates systematically hijacked UN and private commercial trucks — including French aid parcels explicitly stamped "NOT FOR SALE" — funneling stolen relief into markets in Deir al-Balah and Al-Sahaba.
Fair & Effective Distribution of Humanitarian Aid
Even once aid clears delivery obstacles, safely and fairly allocating it remains a challenge. Armed interference, political blockades, and financial gaps within neutral organizations leave civilians in starvation and medical despair.
Types of Distribution
In-kind distribution
Physical goods — food rations, tents, blankets, medical supplies — delivered directly. Most common; coordinated mainly by WFP and UNHCR. Crucial when local supply chains collapse, but suppresses local economic flow.
Cash-Based Transfers (CBTs)
Cash, prepaid cards, or mobile money via UNICEF/UNHRC so recipients buy what they need locally — stimulating local markets, but useless if vendors have nothing in stock.
Vouchers
Paper/digital tokens exchangeable for predetermined goods at partnered vendors — a hybrid, but vulnerable to vendor price-fixing when recipients have no alternative.
Risk Factors by Type
- In-kind: hijacking, checkpoint "taxes," substitution with lower-quality goods.
- CBTs: vendors spike prices in crisis conditions, eroding purchasing power; depends on functioning markets and financial infrastructure.
- Vouchers: partnered vendors can collectively inflate prices or supply substandard/expired goods, knowing recipients lack alternatives.
Struggles in Humanitarian Aid Distribution
The International Rescue Committee notes that more than 305 million people worldwide need life-saving assistance; in contexts like Gaza, civilians face enormous barriers to accessing aid safely and with dignity.
Contradiction with IHL
Under IHL, warring parties must permit and facilitate rapid, safe, unimpeded passage of impartial aid. Fourth Geneva Convention Art. 23 specifically requires free passage of medical supplies, religious objects, and essential food/clothing for vulnerable civilians — even to an enemy population.
Legal Mandates vs. Ineffective Enforcement
Despite these mandates, Israel has continuously restricted access; more than 15 UN entities and up to 200 NGOs have negotiated against — and rejected — Israeli proposals to dismantle the existing UN-run distribution system (OCHA, 2025). Gaza's medical rehabilitation system remains near collapse from overwhelming casualties and a shortage of professionals and infrastructure.
Case Study: An Allegedly "Non-Neutral" NGO — the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)
The GHF was a short-lived NGO established by Israel that raised concerns among UN experts about exploitation for geopolitical or military agendas. More than 1,400 people were killed and 4,000 injured in the process of seeking food during its operation, including nearly 859 people killed by armed personnel opening fire at GHF-operated distribution sites. It represented an unsuccessful attempt to replace UNRWA. Facing sustained international backlash over apparent violations of the four humanitarian principles, GHF ceased operations in November 2025.
The original background guide material describes GHF largely in the present tense, as an ongoing "alternative mechanism" under dispute. As of this edition, GHF is defunct (closed Nov 2025) — treat GHF discussion as a closed case study and cautionary precedent for any future "alternative distribution mechanism," not a live institution. It remains highly relevant to debate, since the same design questions (state-linked NGO vs. neutral UN-run distribution) are likely to resurface as the Board of Peace / NCAG framework under UNSC Res. 2803 develops.
🇷🇺Russia PositionCriticized the GHF mechanism (without naming it directly) as compromising UN neutrality▾
Summary
Russia did not name "Gaza Humanitarian Foundation" directly, but its 13 May 2025 Security Council statement criticizing a "new aid distribution mechanism" matches GHF's timing and design closely enough to be read as a direct reference.
Details
- 13 May 2025: Russia said the new mechanism lacked the support of the UN Secretariat or frontline humanitarian partners, and effectively asked UN agencies to become "complicit" in Israeli military operations — endangering the neutrality and impartiality of UN humanitarian action.
- Aug 2025: 14 of 15 Security Council members (all but the US) issued a joint statement of "grave concern" over IPC famine data — Russia and China both joined, described by independent outlet PassBlue as "a rare move," indicating Russia's position here was aligned with the broader Council, not isolated.
- GHF ceased operations in November 2025.
Sources
russiaun.ru (13 May 2025) PassBlue (29 Aug 2025) SWI swissinfo.ch (GHF closure)Ineffective Allocation: Blockades & Halted Dialogue
The conflict is fundamentally a dispute over land, national identity, and borders. As sole military operations proved insufficient for Israel's stated aims, aid restriction became a parallel tool — sparking accusations that this connects to broader political incentives, amid international debate (and, from some quarters, allegations of genocide). Ceasefire terms remain contested: Israel demands full Hamas military withdrawal and hostage release; Hamas and Palestinians demand a permanent end to operations, full Israeli troop withdrawal, and release of Palestinian prisoners.
Armed men affiliated with Hamas forcibly entered the Abu Rashid food distribution point and a WFP warehouse in Jabalia Refugee Camp, assaulting two truck drivers and forcing the UN to halt food distribution across northern Gaza. UN Deputy Special Coordinator Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov condemned the incident as endangering humanitarian workers and constraining organizations' ability to operate.
Present Challenges
Movement Restrictions
Since end of January 2025, no visas/permits have been granted for UNRWA staff entering the Occupied Palestinian Territory; since March 2025, UNRWA has been blocked from bringing aid into Gaza. In the West Bank, most checkpoints remain closed to inter-city travel, per OCHA.
🇷🇺Russia PositionSustained, consistent supporter of UNRWA against funding cuts and operational restrictions▾
Summary
Russia has repeatedly and consistently backed UNRWA through the funding crisis and Israel's operational restrictions.
Details (chronological)
- 6 Nov 2024: Russia backed the UN Secretary-General and UNRWA Commissioner-General's calls for Israel to withdraw/not enforce legislation restricting UNRWA operations.
- 28 Jan 2025: Russia reaffirmed that "Russia and Russian civil society will continue to firmly support UNRWA," and noted the Russian Peace Foundation (a civil, non-governmental body) had nominated UNRWA for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.
- 24 Mar 2026: Russia said UNRWA's financial difficulties were a more serious threat than regional escalation, urging continued funding.
- 19 Jun 2026: Russia warned that "any attempt to expel UNRWA from Gaza or replace it with a temporary arrangement will only deepen the chaos," urging active participation in UNRWA's funding pledge conference.
- Historical context: Russia's first UNRWA general-fund contribution was $2M in 2013, with the UN noting the symbolic significance of a BRICS member's participation.
Sources
russiaun.ru (multiple, 2024–2026) un.org/unispal (2013 contribution record)Inspections & Restrictions
Every truck requires lengthy coordination and inspection with Israeli authorities, increasing spoilage of food and medicine. Inspections also deny entry to items like solar panels, generators, and vehicle parts, plus foods flagged "dual-use." Although access has improved somewhat, only the Kerem Shalom/Abu Salem crossing remains reliably open, limiting delivery volume.
🇷🇺Russia PositionContinued concern over Rafah crossing status and stalled implementation of the peace plan▾
Summary
Russia has flagged the still-limited state of the Rafah crossing and broader aid volumes, questioning implementation progress on the Trump peace plan (UNSC Res. 2803).
Details
- 24 Mar 2026 statement: only Kerem Shalom is fully operational; Rafah is only partially reopened for personnel (not goods); aid volume down 80–90% versus earlier periods; drinking water, food, and medicine remain short; reconstruction materials (e.g. building supplies) are still being blocked by Israel.
- Russia stated it "sees no sign" of the Trump Gaza peace plan (endorsed by UNSC Res. 2803) being implemented.
Sources
russiaun.ru (24 Mar 2026)Feb 2026 reporting indicates Rafah partially reopened for personnel movement only; cargo remained closed. This postdates the original guide's coverage.
Military Activities
Ongoing airstrikes disrupt distribution routes and damage medical facilities, harming civilians, aid workers, and medical teams alike; constant displacement further disrupts planned aid activities.
WASH (Water, Sanitation & Hygiene) Sector
Delays in delivering repair materials (blocked under the blockade) worsen the crisis; damaged sanitation facilities contaminate groundwater and threaten public health.
Past Attempts
World Food Programme
Active in Gaza since 1991. Currently delivers food parcels, nutrition services, and cash to 1.5M people/month; runs community kitchens serving 250,000 meals/day; supports 28 bakeries; digital cash transfers to 100,000 families.
Operation Gallant Knight 3 (UAE)
Launched 5 Nov 2023 — emergency relief, healthcare, logistics, and rehabilitation. Delivered 126,000+ tonnes of aid since 2023; treated 230,000+ patients via UAE field/floating hospitals.
Egypt (case study)
Sent the first post-conflict aid convoy on 21 Oct 2023 (20 trucks, food and medicine, no fuel). 200+ convoys and over one million tonnes of aid since.
Saudi Arabia (case study)
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Campaign (2009) has donated millions via UNRWA; KSrelief established a central kitchen in central Gaza feeding hundreds of thousands.
Case Study: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Gaza
Most of this guide's Gaza material reflects the state of the conflict through roughly 2023–early 2025. Since then:
- Oct 2025: Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire under a 20-point plan proposed by the Trump administration, signed at the Sharm El-Sheikh international peace summit.
- Nov 2025: GHF formally ceased operations (see §4.1 above).
- 17 Nov 2025 — UNSC Res. 2803: established the post-conflict governance framework: the Board of Peace (BoP), chaired by Donald Trump, and the International Stabilization Force (ISF) under U.S. commander Jasper Jeffers, plus the technocratic, non-political National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) — none including Hamas or Fatah members, based in Egypt as of this writing. China and Russia abstained (13–0–2).
- 2026: Rafah crossing partially reopened in February (personnel only, not cargo); Israel imposed new NGO registration rules (Dec 2025–Jan 2026) that led to 37 international NGOs — including MSF and Mercy Corps — having their Gaza/West Bank operating permits suspended; ISF deployment details remain unsettled as of Feb 2026 ("no concrete details," per Russia).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a protracted dispute over land, security, and self-determination between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River — one of the most complex and longest-running conflicts in modern history.
Over 90% of the population suffers severe hunger; 95% of medical facilities are damaged or destroyed. Per the UN's 2025 emergency appeal, 3.3 million people across Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem require humanitarian assistance. As of 10 May 2026, cluster statistics record 1.1M+ meals delivered daily, shelter/non-food items to 26,521 households, and expanded clean-water distribution.
Per OCHA, regular IDF denial or delay of coordinated humanitarian movements has wasted time and resources while civilians remain in urgent need; the Rafah closure has further complicated access, and collapse of local policing has left convoys vulnerable to armed groups.
~US$4 billion requested to meet humanitarian needs; only ~US$1.6 billion provided by Member States — a shortfall of roughly US$2.4 billion.
🇷🇺Russia PositionModest, symbolic in-kind contributions — well below the scale of the overall funding gap▾
Summary
Russia has a sustained but comparatively limited record of in-kind humanitarian assistance to Gaza, mainly airlifted by Russia's EMERCOM (Ministry of Emergency Situations) via Egypt's Red Crescent.
Timeline of contributions
- 29 Aug 2007: first recorded Russian humanitarian aid to Gaza (food, medicine).
- 22 Apr 2013: first Russian contribution to UNRWA's general fund ($2M).
- 20 Nov 2023: EMERCOM's 20th aid shipment (27 tonnes); cumulative ~190 tonnes.
- 17 Jan 2024: 18th flight of a separate count (30 tonnes); cumulative ~420 tonnes.
- By ~March 2024: 20+ shipments, 480+ tonnes (grain, flour, sugar, hygiene items — some raised by Russian regional governments).
- 22 Jan 2026: President Putin, meeting President Abbas, cited ~32 humanitarian operations and 800+ tonnes delivered at the crisis's worst, plus direct and organization-routed wheat shipments at Abbas's request.
Important context
Against the guide's cited $4B need / $1.6B funded / $2.4B gap, Russia's ~800 tonnes of in-kind aid is modest and largely symbolic rather than a large-scale financial contribution — this should be presented honestly rather than inflated or dismissed.
Sources
un.org/unispal (2013) TASS (Russian state news agency — self-reported figures, no independent verification found) Anadolu Agency; globalsecurity.org citing Xinhua🇷🇺Russia PositionTotal October 2023 blockade condemned as a Fourth Geneva Convention violation▾
Summary
See the fuller record under §3.2 "State Sovereignty" above (Topic 2) — Russia's response to the 9 October 2023 total blockade (electricity, water, fuel, food cut off) is the same body of statements citing Fourth Geneva Convention Arts. 55/56/59, plus Russia's own rejected Oct 2023 draft resolution calling for rescinding the northern-Gaza evacuation order.
Sources
russiaun.ru press.un.org / ReliefWeb / UN NewsMajor Actors
Actors are grouped below by type. Israel and Hamas — the conflict's direct parties — are treated in greater depth, including disputed claims and points of contention, distinct from the more straightforward aid-provider profiles that follow.
State Actors (9)
Israel Conflict party
Maintains that strict "dual-use" screening is necessary to prevent Hamas from diverting military supplies; scope of restricted items has expanded significantly — by late 2025, reporting cited flashlights, non-electric wheelchairs, tarpaulins, sleeping bags, and portable toilets being denied or delayed as "dual-use."
- COGAT (Defense Ministry aid-coordination unit) denies deliberately obstructing aid, maintaining it has "provided sufficient food and shelter supplies."
- Government Resolution No. 2542 (Dec 2024) required international organizations aiding "Palestinian residents" to register with Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; from Dec 2025, 37 international NGOs (~15% of Gaza's total) — including MSF and the Norwegian Refugee Council — had permits suspended for non-compliance.
- Israeli military officials reportedly acknowledged privately (Jul 2025) finding no concrete evidence of "systematic" Hamas theft of aid, even as official public messaging continued to cite this as grounds for restrictions — a noted gap between internal assessment and public justification.
- A Jan 2025 Guardian report alleged Israel permitted commercial traders to import goods classified "dual-use" while denying the same items to humanitarian organizations — criticized as favoring Israeli-linked commercial channels over pure security rationale.
Hamas Conflict party
Has long administered Gaza's local governance; designated a terrorist organization by Israel and several Western states.
- Under the Oct 2025 ceasefire framework, Hamas signaled willingness to hand over governance to the new NCAG (which excludes Hamas members) — but as of 2026, concrete arrangements for Hamas disarmament remain unresolved; recent signals suggest Hamas seeks to retain light weapons or a role in Gaza policing rather than full disarmament.
- May–Oct 2025: deadly incidents near GHF distribution points (2,615+ deaths per Wikipedia's tracking) were attributed variously to IDF/GHF-linked private security action and, in some reported cases, Hamas-affiliated actors (e.g. an attack on a bus carrying GHF workers, killing 8).
- "Does Hamas systematically divert/tax aid supplies?" is one of the most sharply contested claims in this conflict. Israel and some Western legislators maintain it as justification for restrictions; Israel's own internal military assessments and multiple NGO investigations have not found corroborating evidence. Guide framing: this remains an unresolved, disputed allegation — not an established fact.
United States
The largest single-country donor to the Palestinian people, working primarily through funding (State Department, USAID) to UN agencies and NGOs (ICRC, WFP, etc.) rather than direct distribution, alongside some air/maritime/truck deliveries.
- Worked with Egypt and Israel on border openings, temporary ceasefires, and increasing truck volumes.
- Supports bilateral aid to both Israel and Palestine as part of broader peace efforts.
Qatar
One of the largest regional donors, delivering through the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) and Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) — funding medical supplies, food, household support, education, and reconstruction via the Gaza Reconstruction Committee.
- QR 200 million contributed by QRCS to projects benefiting ~1.7 million people (food, shelter, water access).
Egypt
Principal gateway to Gaza via the Rafah crossing, through which most aid enters. Sent the first post-conflict convoy (21 Oct 2023); 200+ convoys and 1M+ tonnes since. Egyptian Red Crescent runs a North Sinai logistics center; Egypt also accepts medical evacuations and mediates Israel–Hamas negotiations.
- Rafah's full closure by Israel (2025) forced patients/aid through Israeli crossings instead, with delays sometimes proving fatal for patients awaiting transfer.
Saudi Arabia
Combines funding and diplomacy; position has hardened somewhat as the war progressed while preserving room for eventual normalization talks with Israel.
- Nov 2025: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced ~$1 trillion in planned U.S. investment during a Washington visit, while stating that joining the Abraham Accords depends on progress toward a two-state solution.
- Jul 2025: joined a 26-country statement calling for an immediate end to the war and lifting of all humanitarian restrictions.
- Continues funding via KSrelief (est. 2015) — see also §5.1 Past Attempts.
Turkey
Strongly and repeatedly condemns Israeli military action (President Erdoğan); provides mid-scale in-kind aid.
- As of Aug 2025: ~$15 million in financial support and 101,000 tonnes of supplies via AFAD (disaster management authority), the Turkish Red Crescent, and TIKA (cooperation/coordination agency).
China
Long-standing ceasefire advocate, critical of Israeli military action as "beyond the scope of self-defense"; expanded humanitarian and diplomatic engagement through late 2025.
- 15 Oct 2023: Foreign Minister Wang Yi called Israel's actions "collective punishment" exceeding self-defense.
- May 2025: China's UN representative publicly condemned the new US/Israel-backed aid mechanism (GHF), demanding Israel "fulfill its IHL obligations as the occupying power and lift the blockade immediately."
- Dec 2025: President Xi Jinping pledged $100 million in humanitarian aid to Palestine for relief and reconstruction — a rare large-scale financial commitment seen as China positioning for a voice in Gaza's post-war arrangements. Earlier in the year China donated $3M directly to UNRWA.
- 17 Nov 2025: abstained on UNSC Res. 2803 (alongside Russia); Ambassador Fu Cong issued an explanatory statement urging reconstruction and expressing reservations about the concrete governance arrangements of the Board of Peace.
Russia This delegation
See the Quick Brief above and the 11 inline position cards throughout this guide (accessible via the Russia Panel) for the full, sourced position record on every major sub-issue.
Regional / Multilateral Organizations (3)
European Union
Pushes diplomatically for Israel to fully lift the blockade and allow independent UN/NGO operation, while providing funding and an active border deployment.
- Mar 2025: High Representative Kaja Kallas met the Arab-Islamic Ministerial Committee in Cairo over the collapsed ceasefire.
- Mar 2025: EU stated Hamas "should have no role" in Gaza's future governance, while backing Palestinian Authority reform for an eventual return to governing Gaza.
- Deploys EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) at Rafah to help manage the crossing.
- Apr 2025: condemned the killing of 15 humanitarian workers on 23 March, demanding accountability.
Arab League + Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
Frequently issue joint statements alongside the African Union, strongly condemning Israeli action, cautiously endorsing the Trump peace plan as "a starting point," and firmly opposing any forced displacement of Palestinians.
- Dec 2025: joint Arab League–OIC–AU statement called the Trump plan (endorsed by Res. 2803) "a starting point to end the bloodshed," while condemning Israel's "one-way-only" Rafah reopening and calling any forced displacement of Palestinians "a war crime and grave breach of IHL."
- Mar 2025: the Cairo Summit's "Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan" was adopted by the OIC, with the EU expressing support as a basis for discussion.
UN Agencies & Bodies (4)
OCHA — UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Part of the UN Secretariat; brings humanitarian actors together for emergency response. Does not deliver aid directly — instead coordinates organizations and funding, collects needs data, and advocates with authorities for humanitarian access. Manages the Cluster System to help ensure needs are met and coordinated after crises.
IASC — Inter-Agency Standing Committee
The UN system's highest-level humanitarian coordination forum (not an operational agency). Created and manages the Cluster System, sets priorities via "Scale-Up" protocols, and — chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator — can raise humanitarian issues directly with the Security Council and Secretary-General.
UNRWA — UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
The UN's primary Palestinian-refugee relief and services agency. Repeatedly the target of funding cuts (the U.S. cut its contribution from $364M to $60M in 2018, before freezing all funding) and, since 2025, operational restrictions — staff have been denied entry visas/permits since Jan 2025, and UNRWA has been blocked from bringing aid into Gaza since March 2025.
- Responded to the 2018 crisis with the "DignityIsPriceless" emergency-donation campaign; the episode illustrates UNRWA's structural vulnerability to voluntary-funding swings and political decisions.
WHO — World Health Organization
Repeatedly appeals for fuel and medical-supply deliveries to keep Gaza's hospitals (operating rooms, ICUs, neonatal incubators) functioning — a direct embodiment of the Humanity principle (§3.1). Warned, alongside the ICRC, that the Oct 2023 evacuation order made evacuating ICU patients and premature infants "nearly impossible" — a warning the IDF proceeded past.
International Organizations (1)
ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross
A principal humanitarian actor in Gaza, delivering direct assistance under IHL protection; works independently and neutrally. Established a field hospital in Rafah treating thousands of patients; its Water and Habitat Programme has helped repair water infrastructure. Also a key drafter and advocate of the Geneva Conventions themselves. Acted as neutral intermediary in the 2025 ceasefire's hostage-prisoner exchange (§3.1).
Major Laws
All ten instruments below are presented as neutral statements of fact — treaty/resolution content, vote outcomes, and official positions — without editorializing on which side is correct. Sensitive items are flagged.
1. Charter of the United Nations
Content: Founding treaty of the UN; defines organs, powers, and limits (see §1 Committee Introduction).
Relevance: Establishes that GA3 may only recommend, never bind — the baseline for understanding this entire guide's scope.
Controversy: None.
2. Fourth Geneva Convention (incl. Arts. 18 & 23)
Content: Art. 18 protects hospitals/medical personnel (unless used for hostile purposes); Art. 23 requires free passage of medical supplies, religious objects, and essential food/clothing for vulnerable civilians — even to enemy populations.
Relevance: Central legal basis for the guide's discussion of medical-facility protection and blockade legality.
Controversy: The "military necessity" exception is the core interpretive dispute between Israel and humanitarian organizations.
3. 1977 Additional Protocols I & II
Content: Protocol I strengthens Fourth Geneva Convention protections for civilians in international armed conflict, requiring clearer combatant/civilian distinction and stronger obligations to supply food/medicine without discrimination (168 states party). Protocol II extends protection to non-international armed conflicts (164 states party) — whether it applies to the Israel-Hamas context is itself disputed, since Israel characterizes the conflict as international while Hamas/some scholars frame it as resistance within occupied territory.
Relevance: A key legal basis for humanitarian organizations' argument that non-discriminatory aid access is a stronger obligation than the Fourth Convention alone implies.
Controversy: Both Israel and the United States signed but never ratified either Protocol, and argue they are not fully bound by Protocol provisions beyond the Fourth Convention itself — a recurring argument in legal debate.
4. UNGA Res. 46/182 (1991)
Content: Source of the four humanitarian principles — Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality, Independence (see §3.1).
Relevance: The interpretive framework applied throughout Key Issue I.
Controversy: None in the text itself; application to specific cases is contested.
5. UNGA Res. 181 (1947, Partition Plan)
Content: Proposed partition giving 55% of the land to a Jewish state, 45% to an Arab state, with Jerusalem under UN administration (see §2 History).
Relevance: Foundational historical document for the conflict's origins.
Controversy: Historical — outside current debate scope.
6. UNSC Res. 2728 (2024) Sensitive
Content: Adopted 25 Mar 2024, 14–0–1 (US abstained); demanded an immediate ceasefire for the remainder of Ramadan.
Vote detail: Russia objected before the vote to language weakened from "permanent" to a softer term, proposing an oral amendment to restore "permanent" — the amendment failed 3–1–11 (for: Algeria, China, Russia; against: US); Russia nonetheless voted for the final text. Three days earlier, Russia and China had vetoed a competing US-drafted ceasefire text.
Relevance: Directly cited in Russia's Quick Brief above; a key marker of Council dynamics on ceasefire language.
Controversy: Voting-bloc dynamics and disagreement over resolution language strength.
🇷🇺Russia PositionVoted for Res. 2728 after a failed attempt to strengthen its ceasefire language▾
Summary
Russia voted in favor of UNSC Res. 2728 (2024), but only after objecting to weakened language and attempting, unsuccessfully, to strengthen the text.
Details
- 25 Mar 2024: adopted 14–0–1 (US abstained), demanding an immediate Ramadan ceasefire.
- Before the vote, Russia objected that the resolution's language had been weakened from "permanent" to a softer term, calling this "unacceptable," and proposed an oral amendment to restore "permanent."
- The amendment failed 3–1–11 (for: Algeria, China, Russia; against: US; 11 abstentions) — Russia nonetheless voted for the final text.
- Context: three days earlier (22 Mar), Russia and China had vetoed a competing US-drafted ceasefire resolution.
- Later, on 10 Jun 2024, Russia abstained on a separate US-driven resolution (14–0–1) backing the Biden three-phase ceasefire plan.
Sources
press.un.org (SC15641, official record) UN News (26 Mar 2024) Al Jazeera (10 Jun 2024) Lawfare (30 Jul 2024, third-party legal analysis)7. 1951 Refugee Convention
Content: Foundational international framework for refugee protection.
Relevance: Background framework for Palestinian refugee status discussions (distinct from UNRWA's specific mandate).
Controversy: None directly relevant to this guide's scope.
8. Wassenaar Arrangement
Content: A multilateral export-control framework for dual-use goods and conventional arms, covering 41 member states.
Note on legal status: the Arrangement is non-binding and voluntary — it operates outside the UN system, and members self-implement its guidelines rather than being legally compelled to follow a specific list. This distinction matters directly for the dual-use goods debate (§3.2): humanitarian organizations have alleged Israel's own dual-use restrictions extend beyond Wassenaar's own standard reference list.
Relevance: Direct legal backdrop to the dual-use goods controversy.
Controversy: Scope of Israel's restricted-item list vs. the Arrangement's own reference lists.
9. ICJ 2024 Advisory Opinion on Israel's Policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Sensitive
Core findings (19 Jul 2024):
- Israel's continued occupation of the OPT (including East Jerusalem) is unlawful.
- Israel is obligated to bring its unlawful occupation to an end as rapidly as possible.
- Israel must immediately halt all new settlement activity and evacuate settlers.
- Israel bears an obligation to make reparation for damage caused to natural or legal persons in the OPT.
- The Court found Israel's settlement policy amounts to de facto annexation of part of the OPT, violating the prohibition on acquiring territory by force.
This is an Advisory Opinion, not a binding judgment — a fundamentally different legal category from an ICJ contentious-case ruling. It was issued at the UNGA's 2022 request to guide the GA and Security Council's own subsequent action, and it does not directly rule on Gaza's humanitarian-aid crisis — its focus is the higher-order legality of occupation itself. Its conclusions (ending occupation, reparations) are nonetheless frequently cited in humanitarian-aid debates as establishing that Israel bears "positive obligations" toward the occupied territory. Delegates should not treat this Opinion as carrying the binding force of a Court judgment.
Sources: ICJ official documents (Summary, Aug 2024); Diakonia (humanitarian-law NGO summary); ReliefWeb; Law for Palestine (pro-Palestinian-leaning think tank — flagged); Verfassungsblog (German academic legal blog — neutral academic analysis)
10. UNSC Res. 2803 (2025) Sensitive
Content: Adopted 17 Nov 2025, 13–0–2 (China and Russia abstained). Endorses the Trump administration's 20-point "comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict" (announced 29 Sep 2025) and the "Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity" (signed 13 Oct 2025). Formally establishes the Board of Peace (BoP), chaired by Donald Trump, as a transitional governance body; authorizes the BoP and participating member states to form an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for security, training a new Palestinian police force, and overseeing demilitarization and reconstruction (current commander: U.S. Lt. Gen. Jasper Jeffers). Permits creation of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a technocratic, non-political Palestinian body for day-to-day public services — explicitly excluding any prospect of Gaza's occupation or forced territorial change. Provides that resumed humanitarian aid should proceed in coordination with the BoP, follow relevant international-law principles, and route through UN agencies and bodies such as the Red Crescent that are unaffiliated with either side.
Board of Peace's own May 2026 progress report: humanitarian aid volume up over 70% since the ceasefire began; nearly 300,000 tonnes of supplies delivered cumulatively; basic food needs stabilizing for the first time since 2023.
Separate UN data (as cited elsewhere in this guide, e.g. Russia's 24 Mar 2026 statement): overall aid volumes in Q1 2026 actually declined, with Rafah crossing still severely restricted and reconstruction materials blocked.
These two figures come from different sources measuring different things (or different time windows) and have not been reconciled by an independent third party as of this writing — delegates should treat both as claims to be weighed, not settled facts.
Points of contention at adoption: Pakistan and other Council members flagged the text's lack of a clear political pathway to Palestinian statehood, insufficient recognition of the Palestinian Authority's role in governance and reconstruction, and unclear ISF mandate scope. China and Russia's abstentions reflected reservations about the concrete arrangements of a "not-yet-established" governance body and the Palestinian Authority's exclusion from the transitional framework.
Sources: press.un.org (SC16225, official meeting record); UN unispal (BoP implementation progress report, May 2026); boardofpeace.org (official BoP site, full resolution text); Chatham House (UK think tank, neutral analysis); ASIL (American Society of International Law, academic analysis); Wikipedia (cross-sourced summary)
Position Matrix
Core disputes as they've solidified through 2026: border control vs. humanitarian access, the GHF-style "alternative mechanism" question, ceasefire conditions, and IHL-compliance determinations.
| Actor | Border control vs. humanitarian access | GHF / alternative distribution mechanisms | Ceasefire conditions | IHL compliance determination |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | Security screening (dual-use control) essential; unilateral authority via COGAT | Framed as a Hamas-proof alternative to UN-run distribution; now defunct | Full Hamas disarmament + hostage release required | Cites "military necessity" exception; denies deliberate obstruction |
| Hamas | Views unrestricted aid as essential to civilian survival & own legitimacy | Opposed GHF as bypassing established UN channels/legitimacy | Permanent end to operations, full IDF withdrawal, prisoner release | Accuses Israel of blockade-as-collective-punishment |
| United States | Backed Israeli screening framework; largest single-country donor via UN/NGO channels | Backed GHF's creation; now backs BoP/ISF under Res. 2803 | Brokered the Oct 2025 ceasefire and 20-point plan | Generally defers to Israeli security rationale |
| Russia (this delegation) | Prioritizes humanitarian access; cites Fourth Geneva Convention Arts. 55/56/59 against restrictions | Criticized GHF-style mechanism as compromising UN neutrality (without naming GHF) | Ceasefire as precondition for aid, not its result; welcomed Oct 2025 ceasefire with reservations | Consistently frames Israeli restrictions as IHL violations |
| China | Calls for immediate blockade lift; "occupying power" framing | Publicly condemned the new mechanism (May 2025) | Long-standing ceasefire advocate | Called Israeli action "beyond self-defense," "collective punishment" |
| EU | Calls for full blockade lift + independent UN/NGO access | No explicit position located; emphasizes UN-channel primacy generally | Backs PA-led post-war governance; excludes Hamas | Condemned killing of aid workers; calls for accountability |
| Arab League / OIC | Strongly condemns restrictions and one-way crossing openings | No explicit GHF position located; broadly favors UN-channel distribution | Endorses Trump plan as "a starting point" with reservations | Calls forced displacement "a war crime / grave IHL breach" |
Glossary
Terms marked like this throughout the guide also show this definition on hover/tap.
Open Debates
Points the guide text explicitly leaves open, extracted from language such as "remains a point of contention" or "still needs discussion."
Potential Solutions
Potential aspects for discussion include humanitarian access, funding, international coordination, civilian protection, and IHL compliance.
Temporary Ceasefires
Reduce civilian harm while enabling safe, uninterrupted aid delivery, medical evacuation, and infrastructure repair. Delegates may consider scope, duration, monitoring mechanisms, and verification of compliance. ↳ linked to §3.2 Sovereignty debate
🇷🇺Russia PositionConsistent advocate for an immediate, unconditional, open-ended ceasefire as the precondition for aid▾
Summary
Russia has repeatedly pushed for a ceasefire with no conditions or time limit, treating it as the precondition for delivering humanitarian aid rather than an outcome to be earned through aid negotiations.
Details
- Nov 2023: Russia (with the US) abstained on a UAE-sponsored "humanitarian pause" resolution, which nonetheless passed 13–0.
- Consistent line: a ceasefire is the precondition for humanitarian work, not its result.
- 23 Oct 2025 (Russia's Security Council presidency period): Russia welcomed the Israel-Hamas cessation of hostilities as "what Russia and other Council members have called for over the past two years," while noting "many issues critical to resolving the broader Middle East question" remained outside the final text, and that humanitarian access restrictions had not been fully lifted.
Sources
Fox News, citing Reuters/AP (Nov 2023 vote) russiaun.ru (23 Oct 2025)Support Local Humanitarian Organizations
Local organizations often have deeper community ties and faster emergency response. Delegates may propose increased financial/technical support and stronger local-international partnerships, alongside transparency and accountability safeguards to ensure funding reaches intended beneficiaries.
Enhance Monitoring & Transparency
Better monitoring — digital tracking, information-sharing among actors, more accurate delivery reporting — reduces duplication and diversion, though security conditions and damaged communications infrastructure limit what's achievable. ↳ relevant to GHF/alternative-mechanism debate, §10
Improve Logistics & Supply Chains
Increasing entry-point capacity/hours, expanding warehouse storage, repairing transport roads, and streamlining customs would speed delivery — but logistics improvements alone are insufficient without safe humanitarian access as a precondition. ↳ §3.2 Sovereignty
Ensure IHL Compliance
Since much else depends on it, delegates may treat IHL compliance as a foundational solution — using diplomacy, UN mechanisms, and supporting agreements to press parties toward their existing obligations. ↳ §3.2 IHL
Timeline of Events
Israeli Disengagement from Gaza
Israel withdrew its military and 8,000+ settlers, ending 38 years of occupation — while retaining control of Gaza's airspace, waters, and land borders.
Blockade of the Gaza Strip
After Hamas took control of Gaza, Israel tightened restrictions into a land/sea/air blockade, sharply limiting movement of people and goods.
Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM)
Established post-2014 war to allow reconstruction imports under Israeli supervision; proved ineffective within two years, arguably normalizing the blockade rather than resolving it.
UNRWA Funding Crisis
The U.S. cut UNRWA funding from $364M to $60M, then froze it entirely — a $300M+ gap harming education, healthcare, and food supply for 5M+ refugees. UNRWA launched the "DignityIsPriceless" emergency campaign.
Total Siege of Gaza
Israel announced a total blockade on 9 Oct 2023, cutting electricity, water, fuel, and food after Hamas's 7 Oct attack — deepening a severe humanitarian crisis. 🇷🇺 Russia's rejected draft resolution and Geneva Convention criticism date from this period — see §5.2 inline card.
Maritime Corridor & Airdrops
With land routes blocked and Gaza in acute famine conditions, airdrops, EU sea lanes, and a temporary U.S. pier were attempted — all proved costly, dangerous, and insufficient relative to reopened land routes.
UNSC Res. 2728 Adopted
14–0–1 (US abstained) demand for an immediate Ramadan ceasefire. 🇷🇺 Russia's amendment to restore "permanent" language failed 3–1–11; Russia still voted for the final text. See §7 Major Laws #6.
Israel–Hamas Ceasefire
Reached under the Trump administration's 20-point plan, signed at the Sharm El-Sheikh international peace summit.
GHF Dissolves; UNSC Res. 2803 Adopted
GHF formally ceased operations amid international backlash. On 17 Nov, Res. 2803 passed 13–0–2 (🇷🇺 China and Russia abstained), establishing the Board of Peace, ISF, and NCAG framework. See §7 Major Laws #10.
NGO Registration Crackdown
Israel's new registration requirements led to 37 international NGOs (including MSF, Mercy Corps) having Gaza/West Bank permits suspended.
Rafah Crossing Partially Reopens
Personnel movement resumed; cargo remained closed as of this reporting.
Russia Flags UNRWA Crisis & Rafah Status
🇷🇺 Russia's 24 Mar statement called UNRWA's financial situation more urgent than regional escalation, and reported aid volumes down 80–90% versus earlier periods, with reconstruction materials still blocked.
Board of Peace Progress Report
BoP's own implementation report claims aid volumes up 70%+ since ceasefire began, alongside separate UN data showing a Q1 decline — see §7 Major Laws #10 for both figures.
Abu Rashid / Jabalia Incident
Hamas-affiliated armed men forcibly entered a WFP warehouse and distribution point, halting food distribution across northern Gaza. See §4.1.
Questions to Consider
- How can the ICRC and OCHA maintain neutrality, impartiality, and independence in highly politicized environments while balancing their mandate against host-state sovereignty?
- How can major donors — the U.S. and Gulf states among them — ensure aid reaches vulnerable populations without being shaped by political interests?
- What operational strategies can humanitarian actors use to protect convoys and personnel where local policing has collapsed and non-state armed groups hold influence?
- How should a state's right to control its borders be balanced against the urgent need for unimpeded humanitarian access?
- What makes accountability for violations of the laws of war so difficult to achieve, and how can the international community close these gaps without worsening the crisis?
References
- McMahon–Hussein correspondence & Balfour Declaration — background history sources compiled in original guide.
- United Nations. "General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947)."
- Council on Foreign Relations. "A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal." 19 Nov. 2025. cfr.org
- European Commission. "Humanitarian Aid." civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu
- European Commission. "Humanitarian Principles." civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu
- European Parliament. "Humanitarian Aid." europarl.europa.eu
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- ICRC. "Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 23)." 2023. ihl-databases.icrc.org
- ICRC. Official site. icrc.org
- ICRC. "Israel, Blockade of Gaza and Flotilla Incident." casebook.icrc.org
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- Journal of Al-Mubadara. Vol. 5, No. 2, 2026. doi.org/10.61312/p02zj087
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- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." 24 Oct. 1945. treaties.un.org
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- U.S. Department of Justice. "Syrian National Charged with Diverting $9 Million in U.S.-Funded Humanitarian Assistance to Terrorist Organization." 17 Oct. 2024. justice.gov
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- russiaun.ru. Multiple statements, 2023–2026 (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN). russiaun.ru
- UN News. Multiple articles, 2023–2024. news.un.org
- Al Jazeera. Reporting on UNSC votes, 2024. aljazeera.com
- Lawfare. Third-party legal analysis, 30 Jul. 2024. lawfaremedia.org
- Fox News, citing Reuters/AP. Nov. 2023 UNSC vote reporting. foxnews.com
- TASS. Russian state news agency, 2024–2026 (self-reported figures — flagged). tass.com
- Anadolu Agency. 2024 reporting. aa.com.tr
- globalsecurity.org, citing Xinhua. 2023 reporting. globalsecurity.org
- un.org/unispal. 2013 UNRWA contribution record. un.org/unispal
- Gisha (Israeli human rights organization), 2026. gisha.org
- Human Rights Watch, 2026. hrw.org
- The Times of Israel, 2026. timesofisrael.com
- House of Commons Library briefing, 2026. commonslibrary.parliament.uk
- Wikipedia. "2025 Gaza Strip aid distribution killings" (cross-sourced). en.wikipedia.org
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy — China statement tracker. washingtoninstitute.org
- Middle East Eye; Al-Monitor; Newsweek — China statement reporting. middleeasteye.net
- Council on Foreign Relations. Arab-state aid comparison, 2026. cfr.org
- Saudi Press Agency, Jul. 2025. spa.gov.sa
- EEAS (European External Action Service). Multiple statements. eeas.europa.eu
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- ICJ. Advisory Opinion Summary, Jul.–Aug. 2024. icj-cij.org
- Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Centre. diakonia.se
- Verfassungsblog. Academic legal analysis. verfassungsblog.de
- boardofpeace.org. Official Board of Peace site & Res. 2803 text. boardofpeace.org
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- American Society of International Law (ASIL). asil.org
- PassBlue. 29 Aug. 2025 report on joint IPC statement. passblue.com
- SWI swissinfo.ch. GHF closure reporting. swissinfo.ch